The current British immigration policy under the conservative-liberal government aims to ‘limit non-EU economic migrants, ...reduce inflow, [and] minimise abuse of all migration routes’ (Home Office, undated). In an integrating world with ever increasing trade, travel and migration, this, notably the aim to ‘reduce inflow’ seems like an absurd statement trying at turning back the clock, ignoring the factual and aiming at the impossible. It thus seems like a recipe for failure.

Meanwhile, the British immigration control system is subject to constant reforms, almost tossed about in recent years by politics and under constant critical scrutiny from left and right. In 2007, the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA) had been formed to take over from the previous Immigration and Nationality Directorate IND. Only one year later, BIA, UKvisas, then part of the Foreign Office, and some parts of HM Revenue and Customs were merged into a huge new apparatus, the UK Border Agency (UK BA). In 2011, its head, Brody Clark, was dismissed after a controversy between the Immigration Minister and the service over how to handle excessive controls at borders. Finally, in March 2012, UK BA was split up again into the UK BA and a new UK Border Force.

These ongoing institutional reforms, criticisms and changes of leadership are creating, as it seems, an atmosphere of uncertainty, adds to a mentality of siege and results in frustration of its staff. Even the immigration minister admits that ‘UKBA has been a troubled organisation since it was founded in 2008’ (Metro 2012), but probably for a lot longer. Paul O'Connor, national officer for the Home Office at the Public and Commercial Services Union admits that ‘morale was very low, due to a mixture of staff cuts and pay freezes. The UKBA was struggling to provide the service they would like to provide, he added’ (House of Commons 2012a).

This essay is just to give a flavour of the disarray UK migration policy, management and border control are in and the costs and delays, controversies and frustrations this causes on policy, business and NGO side.

Failing on its service responsibility

In April 2012, it was reported that UK BA missed its target for waiting times at passport controls at 23 out of 30 days (BBC 2012a). On one day, 30 April people were queuing for up to three hours at terminal 4. This was a repetition of similar problems experienced in 2011. Simultaneously, Mark Hammond, Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC 2012) expressed ‘serious concerns’ over how passengers were treated, notably ‘discrimination against passengers and the protection of their human rights’ at Gatwick airport, North terminal (also see Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 2012). Ian Duncan Smith, conservative minister, when asked on TV (BBC1 2012) for his opinion on the severe delays at passport controls at Heathrow airport, 2 ½ hours in April, argued that this is not unusual as he was waiting for two hours and more in Washington. Typical in this instance was reference to the US and not, for instance, Germany or Sweden; this shows that the UK is not taking the other EU member states as point of reference and standards but rather a non-EU country on the other side of the Atlantic ocean.

This problem is due to two issues. On the one hand, the UK insists in maintaining passport controls of arrivals from the EU Schengen countries. This requires significant levels of staff. On the other hand, the government as part of their public spending cuts also cut staff of UK BA by almost 900. Thus, the problems are caused by what could be considered unnecessary controls, unnecessary because there is no evidence from other EU countries that this undermines security, whilst paradoxically reducing staffing levels.

Also in April, the computer system of the biometric residence permit system that was introduced four years ago, in 2009, temporarily collapsed. A lawyer of a leading UK law firm, Andrew Tingley, ‘said the collapse was "beyond farcical" because many applicants needed to have their permit dealt with on the same day’. He concluded, ‘the system that was introduced was not fit for purpose, ...it was close to collapse a few weeks ago. It has now collapsed. It's an absolute mess’ (BBC 2012b).

Some of these failures are said to have severe consequences for the UK as a business location. ‘Employers are saying they can't access a reasonable immigration system and they're considering moving abroad. They've come to the point now where they're seriously considering not investing or working in the UK because they can't access any reasonably competent system’ (Tingley on BBC 2012b). This implies that failing the service function of immigration control is not accidental but systematic and that it potentially has fundamental negative consequences for the UK as a whole.

Violating human rights standards

Only the following month, the Independent Monitoring Board, a statutory agency introduced by law, the Prison Act 1952 (Section 6) respectively the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 reported a serious breach of standards of immigration detention by the UK Border Agency. Notably, it was found that two women have been kept at Yarl's Wood removal centre for two-and-a-half years. It was criticised that they were kept in detention ‘with no realistic prospect of deportation’ (BBC 2012c), and thus that ‘the UK Border Agency had breached standards’. It comes to the conclusion that ‘Yarl's Wood was "not fulfilling its basic function"’, that "the financial costs of this failure, as well as the costs in terms of human suffering ...are immense"’ (BBC 2012c).

Also the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, another statutory agency set out in Section 5A of the Prison Act 1952 in 2011 criticised that ‘too many pregnant women, who should only have been held in exceptional circumstances, were detained in the centre’ (CIP 2012: 6), that family members were separated and even held in different centres (: 12), which would amount to cruelty, that ‘detainees found it difficult to get advice about their cases’, that they had ‘insufficient contact with immigration staff’ and that ‘results of detention reviews were not consistently reported to detainees as required’ (: 5). This implies that the legal right to access to legal remedies was violated. The HM CIP also expressed concerns over holding ‘vulnerable detainees, including those with disabilities’ (: 6) in immigration detention.

These complaints add to numerous similar reports suggesting that UK BA constantly and systematically oversteps legal standards; this implies that enforcement is given priority which has detrimental effects on human rights of immigrants.

Alienating stakeholders

The government’s attempts to reduce immigration have alienated several stakeholders. For instance, the UK student immigration system and efforts to reducing students coming from abroad, the fees they bring in are considered crucial for the economic survival of the UK’s universities, are denounced ‘as being "chaotic" and a waste of universities' time and money’ by university representatives. It is criticized that UKBA ‘regulations have now gone too far, affecting legitimate language schools and students as well as the bogus ones’ (House of Commons 2012b).

Also the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC 2012) complains about ’the problem of poor border management [that puts the UK’s] reputation and future prosperity at risk’, the Recruitment and Employment Confederation (2012) ‘remain opposed to the immigration cap’ and the Royal College of Nursing (2012) ‘has expressed grave concerns about changes to UK immigration policy, which will see nursing staff from overseas being forced to leave Britain’.

Finally, the Tourism Alliance protests about negative impact on the industry and the signals the failure of the system is sending out to the world. Brigid Simmonds (Tourism Alliance 2012) expressed the tourism industry's growing concerns; she complained about delays at entry controls that in demonstrate ‘cracks in the system’.

Un-intended effects

Despite politics aiming at tough enforcement the UK has one of the highest levels of an irregular migrant populations in the EU, 417 000-863 000 in 2008 (most recent estimate), up from 310,000-570,000 in 2001 (see Irregular Migration Net 2009). Beyond the attractiveness of the UK there are other explanations for this, (1) the ‘ratchet effect’ as observed in the US meaning that due to illiberal immigration restrictions and strict border controls those who make it into the country are less likely to leave again but rather overstay and/or stay longer, (2) the government’s notorious refusal to introduce a regularisation programme which successfully significantly reduced the level of irregular immigrants in many other EU countries, (3) the discrepancy between political rhetoric of tough enforcement aiming at pacifying the media and a reality of lack of resources and still relatively low levels of enforcement operations and (4) the liberal dilemma, meaning that human rights, employers rights and ethnic minority rights limit the power of enforcement agencies. But whilst (3) and (4) also apply to other EU countries (1) and (2) are specific to the UK and are thus more likely to explain the comparably high level of irregular immigration in the UK. Also lack of tolerance towards some deviation from the law, impractical immigration and employment regulations, low refugee recognition rates and changing legislation and the impact of the economic crisis that deprive formerly legal migrants of their status and drive them underground but not out of the country, as intended all contribute to this situation (see Düvell 2011).

References[1]

BBC (2012a), Waiting target for non-EEA visitors at Heathrow missed in April, 3/5/2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17937880.

BBC (2012b), UK Border Agency ID card system crashes, 3/5/2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17943589

BBC (2012c), UK Border Agency criticised over Yarl's Wood detention, News, 18/5/2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-18118155.

BBC1 (2012), Question time, 3/5/2012.

British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) (2012), We need to show the world that Britain is open for business, says BCC, Press Release, 4/5/12.

Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2012), Inspection of Gatwick Airport North Terminal, http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Inspection-of-Gatwick-Airport-North-Terminal.pdf.

Düvell, Franck (2011), Paths into Irregularity: The Legal and Political Construction of Irregular Migration, European Journal for Migration and Law, 13(3): 275-295.

Equality and Human Rights Commission (ECRC) (2012), Press Releases, 10/05/12.

HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (CIP) (2012), Report on an announced inspection of Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre, 4–8 July 2011, London: CIP, http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/hmipris/immigration-removal-centre-inspections/yarls-wood/yarls-wood-2011.pdf.

Home Office (undated), Passport and immigration, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/passports-and-immigration/.

House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2012a), The work of the UK Border Agency and UK Border Force, 15/5/2012.

House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee (2012b), Immigration points - student routes, 14/5/2012.

Irregular Migration Net (2009), Stocks of irregular immigrants: estimates for United Kingdom, http://irregular-migration.net/typo3_upload/groups/31/3.Database_on_IrregMig/3.2.Stock_Tables/UnitedKingdom_Estimates_IrregularMigration_Nov09.pdf.

Metro (2012), UK Border Force to be spun away from UK Border Agency, 20/2/2012, http://www.metro.co.uk/news/890876-uk-border-force-to-be-spun-away-from-uk-border-agency#ixzz1vIop4HDO.

Recruitment and Employment Confederation (2012), Press Release, 4/4/12.

Royal College of Nursing (2012), Press Release, 29/3/12

Tourism Alliance (2010), Border control problems jeopardise government's tourism plans, Press release, 9/5/2012.

On a Wednesday in March, it was already around midnight, I was sitting in an Egyptian-run tea shop in Istanbul Kumkapi chatting so some Somalis when a fifth man joined our group. It soon turned out that he had just arrived from Athens. He was older, probably in his 40, with a face full of scarves that signalled a troubled, apparently partially dangerous life. He described how he had crossed the border between Greece and Turkey clandestinely, though in the ‘atypical direction’, West to East. First, he got lost and accidentally entered Bulgaria, there he was apprehended and sent back but told where to get to Turkey. This he did, as he explained, by swimming across a river. He explained the difficulties he had during four years of living in Athens, ‘no house, no food’, ‘you are illegal, you don’t have documents’ and that ‘there is a party, they say they don’t like foreigners, they come from behind and beat you’. This account illustrates that the combined effect of the economic crisis, legal and social exclusion and politically motivated racial violence pushes migrants including those that are in need of international protection out of the country.

Rumours amongst migrant communities and NGOs in Greece and Turkey hint that more and more migrants who once made it to Greece clandestinely can no longer bear the hardship there and therefore return to Turkey. This implies that a small counter flow of migrants moving irregularly from Greece to Turkey is emerging, sometimes probably risking their lives another time by crossing the river Evros again as the above account suggests. It remains an open question whether and how many stay in Istanbul and integrate into the depths of Istanbul’s shadow economy, how many apply to UNHCR for asylum and hope to be legally resettled to a safe country in Europe or America and how many try to continue going somewhere else or return home.

Many more, however, still try and move in the ‘typical’ direction, East to West. For instance, one morning, I saw some sub-Saharan Africans who had probably just crossed the border walking south along Road 51 near Soufli. And at the train station of Alexandropolis I could at two different occasions observe groups of 30-40 migrants who were just released from police custody - normally issued with a document that requests them to leave the country on their own account - and made their way to Athens by the afternoon train. Larger groups were French speaking, presumably from Algeria, others were from Congo, Sudan, the Middle East and probably South Asia. One group of Congolese explained ‘we went by Air Maroc to Morocco, to Casablanca, and from Casablanca we went to Istanbul with Turkish Airlines. It took only one day, Congo-Casablanca, Casablanca-Istanbul. In Istanbul we stayed for about 20 days and then we came here’. Medicine sans Frontiere said they have prepared themselves to numbers rising to over 200 per day in spring and summer, just like in 2011.

My observations also revealed a complex infrastructure of migration control. There is the actual border, a 12,5 kilometre long land border and a 190 kilometre long river border. Since the times of Greek-Turkish hostility the border zone, notably on the Greek side, is highly militarised and the actual border land, a few hundred meters wide, is restricted to enter, except for local farmers. I was nevertheless taken on a tour by one of them. I could see the barbed-wired mine fields; it is said that these are anti-tank not anti-personnel mines but locals remain sceptical. There is also a huge new ditch, again claimed to be a barrier against enemy tanks. Along the border, there are watch towers on both sides, sometimes only meters apart. Paths on both sides run along the border to facilitate patrols. In addition, Greece is currently constructing a 12-kilometre fence on its short land border with Turkey. Finally, there are (only) two border crossing points, a small one in the north, Kastanies/Pazarkule and a larger one in the south, Kipoi/Ipsala.

The control of the Greek border is principally the responsibility of the police, its headquarter for South Evros is in Alexandropolis where also the coast guard is based. But also the army secures the border, though against perceived military threats; the military is indeed omnipresent in the region. Finally, the EU’s border protection agency Frontex has units in the region, in Orestiada and Poros (Frontex 2012). Army and police are officially operate separatedly, though I was told that de facto detainees are transported in army vans. The police and Frontex instead collaborate and (partly) from the same premises. Along the border zone there are three border police stations, Feres, Tychero and Soufli in the southern district, each with some small detention facility, and one large detention centre in Filakio in the northern district. Surprisingly, at the time of my trip all seemed to be closed, closed for renovation with EU-money as large boards explained. There is a new screening centre in Poros, a small village just east of Feres and finally another detention centre in Vena west of Evros. Otherwise, there are two hotels in Orestiada where Frontex officers are based plus one gym which the officers frequent. It is said there is also one brothel on the outskirts of Orestiada used by the Frontex officers.

On the Turkish side there is the military and specifically the Jendarma, a military unit that are responsible for controlling the national borders. There is also a new detention centre on the outskirts of Edirne build under an EU-funded UK-Turkey twinning project (see previous blog), which is still partly under construction. Shortly after my visit the authorities conducted a series of raids in the Ipsala and Meric regions on the border with Greece and arrested around 110 migrants and refugees (Radikal 2012). This not only suggests that the police is actually aware of the whereabouts of irregular immigrants and their facilitators. Even more importantly it could imply, as Ankara sources suggest to me, that Turkish authorities are changing their view on transit migration and are no longer willing to tolerate that the country is used by migrants and refugees as a transit zone. It is also rumoured that after some hesitation the government is now ready to finally sign the readmission agreement with the EU. This would mean that irregular immigrants found in the EU who were entering from Turkey and who do not apply for asylum could be returned to Turkey.

Intensified controls on the Greek side, notably the Frontex operations have already shifted the flow from North to South Evros, and thus from the land to the river border. Whilst locals in the North still want the fence, mainly to protect their crops and to be free of fear when working at night, as they say, they also admit that it is no longer really necessary. If Turkey is now going to enhance control of its borders the main current route for clandestine migration to the EU would be blocked. One consequence could be that more people, notably refugees, will seek asylum in Turkey; this could become yet another challenge for the country. Another consequence could be that people, and the smugglers who facilitate their journeys, move to other routes and ports of departure (like Bulgaria, Aegean again, Libya again, the Balkans and so on). Routes could subsequently become more diverse and dispersed again and thus more difficult to control. What and were this will happen remains to be seen.

Reference

This report is mostly based on interviews I conducted in course of a brief research trip to Turkey and Greece in mid March with migrants in Istanbul/Turkey and Alexandropolis/Greece, and the police, International Organisations, NGOs and local farmers in Greece/Thrace plus observations made in the border region. The Greek part I conducted jointly with Despina Syrri from Thessaloniki.

(¹) See http://frontex.europa.eu/news/greek-turkish-land-border-jo-poseidon-land-situ...

(²) See http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=108...

It is now for several years, that I have been researching (irregular) transit migration, in other words mixed migration and clandestine border crossings from Turkey and Ukraine into the EU, notably to Hungary and Slovakia and on to Austria and Germany, but also through Malta, Italy and Greece. Whilst writing a monograph on my research I have been back to Ukraine and Hungary this month for some update; in March I will also go on a field visit to Turkey and Greece.

In Ukraine and Hungary I met with Somali refugees, six in either country and with refugee support NGOs, two in Ukraine, Kiev and Uzhgorod, and one in Budapest. This generated several new insights, some rather worrying and all require some follow-up.

Ukraine

¨       A hunger strike of 58 Somali refugees in Ukraine, Wolyn detention centre (build with EU-funds), has ended; the detainees decided (a) to apply for asylum (so far they rejected this option as they have normally been rejected as manifestly unfounded and kept in detention, so they felt this would make no sense); (b) they appeal against their detention on grounds that this is a violation of ECHR ruling and generally the refugee convention (also see previous entry).

¨       It turned out that until the hunger strike there was no functional regional Migration Service in Wolyn and thus no authority that would accept asylum claims. Only in response to the hunger strike the MS was re-established. UNHCR must surely have known about this but nevertheless did not seem to have taken decisive action. This requires further investigation but if true this would be outrages. I consider approaching UNHCR about this matter.

¨       According to NGO information UNHCR Ukraine decided to from now on refuse legal assistance to asylum seekers in case they have been apprehended for illegal border crossing more than once. Some NGOs are outraged and already see the consequences in terms of refugees who lack legal representation. To me this seems to be a sort of punishment, as well as a policy that aims at deterring refugees from moving on to the EU. I wonder whether this is now part of UNHCR policy and whether this conforms to the Geneva refugee convention, need to find out more now.

¨       Also at the regional Inter-Agency meeting in Zakarpattya (invited to by UNHCR, attended by government agencies and NGOs) two of the most pressing issues, continued detention of (unaccompanied) minors and the Somali hunger strike were not put on the agenda. So it occurs to me whether these have been deliberately avoided and thus whether UNHCR even contributes to covering up these issues? This also calls for further enquires.

¨       I was also told that the legal representative of the only NGO in the Wolyn region that provides services to refugees, an implementing partner of IOM on another EU-funded project, not only offered legally incorrect and thus unprofessional advice but also requested unduly fees, $300 for facilitating asylum applications. The Somali detainees refused to pay. This could nevertheless qualify as attempted corruption. I consider approaching IOM/Kiev over this matter; I also consider informing the responsible EU project officer about this.

¨       Refugees report that the bribe for being released from Chop detention centre in Zakarpattya and for being accepted for RSD procedures has now risen to $1.125 (up from $6-800 in 2009/10.

¨       Finally, towards the end of 2011, Ukraine introduced new legislation which amongst other changes extended migrant detention from 6 to 12 month.

¨       I was told that certain aspects in the migration routes, migrants’ strategies and smuggling practices have changed once again. Few people are now taken travel into and through Hungary but instead into Slovakia. Also length of stay in the transit zone seems to have decreased again in summer 2011 to often only a few weeks. The issue arising is why this is? For instance, it is claimed that the change of government in Ukraine led to the introduction of a new system of corruption, this is now said to be more centralised and meanwhile working well, hence smuggling is smoother and quicker again. Other reasons could be related to conditions in Hungary (see next section).

Hungary

¨       Somalis and other refugees report that once they have been through the RSD procedures and granted some kind of status they are left without any social support, they explain ‘there is no house, no eat, no education, no language learning, no health care’ and also no assistance in finding work.

¨       Also Hungarian citizenship or family reunification, both avenues have been tried by some, are denied to them (one mother reports that she has been separated from her children for three years, another even for nine).

¨       They report mental health problems, including even a recorded attempted suicide, that are similar to those under the duress of the civil war in Somalia.

¨       So despite having a status their situation seems characterised by destitution. As a consequence most aim to move on to other EU countries; most have actually already been to other countries but returned to Hungary, often several times. They are thus not only sandwiched between countries that refuse to facilitate integration and countries that refuse to take them on at all. They are subjects in a vicious refugee ping pong; for instance, a lady, aged 21 and mother of two has already been returned three times in as many years but has concrete plans to keep trying different countries.

¨       I understood that those with full refugee status will inevitably be returned to the asylum granting country if they are detected in the asylum or benefits system or on the labour market of another country whilst those with subsidiary status or ongoing RSD procedures under some circumstances stand some change to appeal or otherwise repel return under the Dublin II convention. Therefore, some now consider a full refugee status rather a disadvantage.

¨       Somalis said that more and more people coming from Turkey and Greece now cross through Serbia to Hungary; but they are concerned about their fate in Serbia and treatment on the Hungarian border. An NGO lawyer confirmed that there are cases of refused access to Refugee Status Determination procedures, arbitrary detention, including minors, as well as of push backs to Serbia.

¨       Finally, also the ultra-nationalist Hungarian government has changed the law and extended detention from 6 to 12 month.

These observations raise various scientific and ethical issues. How and why do migration routes change over time? How do changes in governments, policies and/or politics impact on migration paths and strategies? The ethical issues are how to respond to some of the policy findings? Should the concerns over some practices of the above mentioned organisations be raised on a discrete and personal level, should this be left to intervention on NGO level (hence, should the researcher report such cases to the relevant NGO actors in the field), should they even be reported to relevant other agencies or is no such action advisable? There is no simple rule to this but researchers need to thoroughly consider their options and thus be able to come to an ethically sound and justifiable decision.

Since 6 January, 58 Somalis, all from the Mogadishu region (13 women, including 7 minors, and 45 men, including 17 minors) who are detained in Zhuravychi detention centre near Lutsk are on hunger strike. On 29/1, they were subsequently attacked by riot police who forcefully took them to the dining room to take pictures of the refugees eating.

The hunger striking refugees demand that:

1) Somali asylum seekers are granted asylum status in Ukraine.
2) They are released from detention.
3) Asylum seekers are provided with documents so they cannot be arrested.
4) There is an end to the police harassment of asylum seekers.
5) No asylum seeker is to face re-arrest after a period of detention.

The detention centre where the Somali and other refugees are kept was set up in 2008 with funds from the EU, € 7.2 million from the ‘Capacity Building in Migration Management’ programme (CBMM), and under IOM management. Another ten EU-funded detention centres are planned (Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine 2010).

European Commission: ‘The EU is supporting Ukraine's efforts to restructure its migration management approach that includes the operational framework related to the detention of irregular migrants’ (see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-studies/ukraine_cbmm_en.pdf).

The detention centre is situated 45 kilometres outside of the remote city of Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine. It has a capacity of 180 detainees, though in January 2011 there were about 130 detainees. Last year, Ukraine amended its immigration law allowing people to be kept in detention for 12 months; they can be detained repeatedly which de facto amounts to indefinite detention. As it seems men and women, unaccompanied minors or whole families including women, pregnant or with children are all detained indiscriminately. One of the hunger strikers is already detained for the fifth time, altogether for over two years now. Notably those who do not or cannot pay bribes to the police will be detained (see BMPU report on Corruption in the asylum and detention system in Ukraine, 2012). Recognition rates of asylum applications vary between zero and three percent, notably Somalis, in particular in the Lutsk district are not normally accepted but refused (see UNHCR press release, 2012). Detainees do not normally have access to lawyers and none of the detainees in Lutsk has one. Otherwise detainees report insufficient nutrition, lack of medical care and other social services (see Jesuit Refugee Service, 2011) and probably infectious skin diseases. It has been widely and internationally agreed by UNHCR, IOM, ICMPD and others that Ukraine does not live up to its obligations under international law and is thus not a safe country for refugees.

Legally, such detention is an administrative measure and meant to facilitate deportation. However, the European Court of Human Rights has already in June 2011 ruled that any native of Southern Somalia needs international protection and shall thus not be deported. Hence, the current Ukrainian practices amount to a(1)  violation of article 31, Geneva Refugee Convention prohibiting imposing penalties on refugees for their illegal entry or presence, (2) article 33, prohibiting refoulement. and (3) article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (prohibition of torture, see ruling of ECHR 2011). Thus, such detention de fact is a kind of punishment for coming to Ukraine or for trying to move on to the EU. They are a direct expression of the migration politics of the EU, notably the externalization of migration control, meaning that the paths to the EU are controlled by the countries in the neighbourhood of the EU and that migrants and refugees on their way west are prevented from doing so by any means necessary, as it seems no matter whether this includes violations of refugee, children or human rights.

Background

For several years, Somalis have been using Ukraine as a transit route from Somalia via Russia to the EU, not in large numbers but a few hundred each year. Once in the EU, they try and continue they journeys to the western countries. There, they usually apply for asylum knowing that it is only there that they stand a chance of being recognised. For instance, in Germany, in 2010, 2,466 Somalis had applied for asylum, around 5 percent of the total. The recognition rate for Somalis was 41.4 percent, three times more than the national average; another 10 percent were granted subsidiary protection (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2011, see http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2011/01/asylzahlen_Dezember2010.html). This demonstrated that in Germany the chances to be accepted as refugee are forty times higher than in Ukraine. There thus is a very obvious reason for Somali refugees to continue their journey to, for instance, the EU.

In 2010 and 2011, Ukrainian authorities are reported to rounding up migrants, in Kyiv they ‘harass merchants at Troyeshchyna market; racism, corruption seen’ notably of ‘non-Slavik appearance’ (Kyiv Post, 5/11/2010) and in Kharkiv they ‘carry out raids at the markets and railway stations of the city. People with exotic appearance are checked their documents and established whether they stay in Ukraine legally’ (Objective TV, 29/6/2011). The authorities also specifically target Somalis, mostly in the city of Vinnitsa. For instance, it was reported that ‘30 migrants from Somalia were detained in Vinnitsa’ even though it was acknowledged that they ‘came to Vinnitsa aiming at a refugee status’ (Korrespondent, 23/12/2011).

There is another dimension to the Ukrainian onslaught on Somali refugees. For years, the mass media portrays Somalis as pirates, like ‘A group of Somali “pirates” attacked the border in Transcarpathia’ (UA Reporter, 22/10/2010) or ‘Resident from Uzhgorod was arrested together with the group of “Somali pirates” in Mukachevo’ (UA Reporter, 7/12/2011). This is because many of the ships abducted by often Puntland-based pirates off the coast of Somalia are manned by Ukrainian sailors (e.g. Faina, 2008; Ariana, Maran Centaurus, 2009; Lugela, Asian Glory, Eleni P, Marida Marguerite, 2010; Beluga, Blida, Montecristo, 2011). Whilst these crimes and the suffering of the affected families is reported in Ukrainian media no distinction is made between pirates and refugees. Thereby, the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia is used to stereotype Somali refugees as criminals and thus not welcomed.

Source: All information, if not stated otherwise, was retrieved from Border Monitoring Project Ukraine (BMPU), http://media.bordermonitoring-ukraine.eu/

 On Wednesday 8 December, the British Prime minister backed by his cabinet exploited the current economic crisis of the EU to veto changes to EU treaties. Notably, he vetoed fiscal control, financial regulations and taxation of financial activities (‘Tobin tax’), which aimed at stabilising the Eurozone, thus the EU economy and subsequently the EU as such but also at addressing some of the shortcomings of the current global financial system. This followed an earlier decision not to contribute to bailing out other member states in crisis, like Greece or Portugal. The two main arguments made were that this is to protect the economic interest of the financial centre of London, ‘the city’ is it is labelled, and that it is in the national interest of the UK. In other words it is in the national interest of the UK to protect ‘the city’. Five points I would like to make here.

First, the UK, during the Thatcher, Major and Blair years pursued another policy than Germany or Italy; it went down the road of deindustrialisation and instead favoured international and domestic services and trade. As a consequence, manufacturing shrank from 22 percent of the GDP in 1990 to only 11 percent in 2009 (Germany: 25 percent, Italy: 20 percent, France: 12.3 percent) and was overtaken by the financial centre of London long ago (BIS 2010). ‘The City’ not only is ‘the largest international banking centre in the world, with banks in the UK accounting for over 20% of global cross-border banking business’ (City of London 2011a). As such it 'has become vital to the UK economy and contributes $565 billion or around 20 percent to the total UK GDP (in 2007) (City of London 2007).  The finance sector is not only central to the UK economy; the UK is also only competitive as a location under the current unregulated conditions it offers.

Second, in the present discussion in the UK, it is widely ignored that it was the politics of the British, and other governments of course, to deregulate financial services, and allow enormous borrowing, lending to private households and states and thus facilitated an economy that is based on dept. The idea was that this would function almost as a perpetuum mobile of never-ending economic growth. In effect, however, the ‘western’ lower and middle classes became entrapped in dept, the ‘southern’ lower classes are starving to their millions whilst the upper classes got ever more affluent and the gap between the haves and have-nots got ever wider. Thus, this system de facto redistributed the global wealth from the bottom to the top. Finally, however, all this collapsed. The mess we are in is thus in part the very responsibility of 'the city' that the UK - Cameron and his liberal deputy Clegg - are now so fiercely protecting. In other words, the British 'national interest' seems to be to continue for very selfish reasons with an economic model that proved disastrous and ruinous for the lives of billions of people!

Third, it has been explained by the British Prime Minister that the decision to object a joint European approach is based on the perceived national interest of the UK (Number 10 2011). This demonstrates that the UK’s politics is now inspired by protectionist and nationalist agendas. It is based on the believe that what is good for the people living on that island can only be achieved by a separate British way and even against the way of the people living in other countries. This nationalist doctrine is complemented by a surge of anti-immigration sentiments. These date back to the mid-2000s and were triggered by the arrival of Polish and other EU nationals coming to work in the UK. This first culminated in 2007, when some sections of the working class launched demonstrations against immigrant workers taking what they perceived were their jobs. The then labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007) in response suggested ‘British jobs for British workers' and thus sanctioned the rise of a hugely nationalist and anti-immigrant agenda. The current conservative government, pushed by some right-wing media attacked the labour government for letting in too many migrants and one of its main policy aims is to diminish immigration. It is thus maybe less of a surprise that only one other country rejected the EU proposal on financial stability and that is Hungary, a country with a proto-fascist government on the brink of insolvency. Already in the European parliament, the British conservative parliamentarians had left the more centre right (Christian democrat pro-Europeans) faction to join the Euro-skeptic far right. Thus the UK is now allied with the most right-wing parties and governments in the EU.

Fourth, over the years, the anti-European and anti-EU rhetoric has successively begun dominating the public policy discourse in the UK. The last years were a period of constantly dripping poison from all parties, Labour, the Conservatives and the right-wing media. In recent month, commentators were almost enjoying the trouble the Euro-zone is in and it seemed they could not wait for it to collapse. Meanwhile, the anti-European rhetoric in the UK – anger over Brussels bureaucracy, regulatory politics or even the EU’s human rights legislation - has almost reached the level of hate-speech (see appendix below). Also the way the French and German leaders are depicted almost reactivates anachronistic images of the eternal arch enemies. Some of this is simply to distract attention from the problems of the UK by focusing on the problems of other countries or even to scapegoat others for the current troubles. For instance, the UK economy is doing much worse than that of several other EU countries; also national bureaucracy is at least as bad, if not worse than what is coming from the EU. These UK responses may in part also be due to the fierce competition from other European countries over technologies, manufacturing, transportation, global services or indeed international power.

Fifth, after WW I the UK has lost its global economic leadership to the US and the dollar, after WW II it lost its colonies to the independence movements and ever since the 1970s, when it joined the then EC, it nevertheless missed its opportunity to instead become a leading player in Europe. On the one hand, the UK likes to present itself as a political, cultural and technological leader on a global scale (see Brown 2007). On the other hand, many seem to envy Germany for its technological and economic success, the French for their ‘savoir vivre’ and the Spanish for their climate whilst still assuming some cultural superiority of Englishness. In any case, the UK seems to never coming to terms with the loss of their empire whilst they also cannot accept the transformation of the Westphalian state order, the idea of sovereign and separate nation states. It may be that it is the literal insular geography of the UK and a deep conservatism rooted in rural England that facilitates such an inflexible mentality of statelessness. Or it may be that the UK perceives its combined military power (it engages in any possible conflict that emerges, e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) and economic power (through London it manages large parts of global capital flows) as strong enough to be able to sustain even a small nation state against the likes of the US, EU, Russia, China, India and other emerging powers.

To sum up, in response to the current economic and political crises the UK opted for a combination of anti-immigration, protectionist, anti-European and nationalist but also occasionally militarist and simultaneously ruthlessly selfish and callous neo-liberal agendas. The UK has alienated most other member states and is now de facto allied with the far-right, sometimes almost proto-fascist parties and governments in Europe. In the statements ensuing from the British veto it became clear, not for the first time though, that the UK is mainly interested in free trade and in the EU as a single market and not as a political project. Thus, the UK looks at Europe from a purely neo-liberal perspective. The main reason why the UK does not yet leave the EU, as many conservatives would probably hope, seems to be this economic deliberation.

References

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BILS (2010), Manufacturing in the UK, Economic paper 10b, London: BIS, www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-sectors/docs/m/10-1334-manufacturing-in-the-uk-supplementary-analysis.pdf

Brown, Gordon (2007), Labour party conference speech,

City of London (2007), A capital contribution - London’s Place in the UK Economy, 2007-08, news release, http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/media_centre/files2007/A+capital+contribution+-+Londons+Place+in+the+UK+Economy+2007-08.htm

City of London (2011a), Research and statistics, http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/LGNL_Services/Business/Business_support_and_advice/Economic_information_and_analysis/Research+and+statistics+FAQ.htm

Number 10 (2011), Eurozone: 'I will protect the national interest’ PM says, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/eurozone-i-will-protect-national-interest-says-pm/

Appendix

The following quotes only give a flavour of the current discourse on the EU and only refer to some comments made during debates in parliament.

‘The British national interest: safeguarding the single market and the financial services’, Prime Minister Cameron; (see Parliament UK 2011, House of Commons, Oral answers to questions, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa.cam201011/cmhansrd/cm111207/debtext/111207-0001.htm#11120739000033). ‘EU institutions operate against our interests’, MP Jenkin; ‘truly frightening conglomeration of power on the continent’ MP Leigh; [relocating a the currency clearing house] is ‘daylight robbery and stealing our business’, MP Leadsom; ‘the creation of a de facto country perhaps called Greater Germany’ MP Jackson; ‘people are fed up with mindless interference from the EU’, MP Baron; ‘the fantasy world ...of trying to create economic and political union’, ’other countries ...are in effect economic satellites of Germany’, MP Cash; ‘we want control over our borders back because [my constituents] are fed up with mass immigration from the European Union’, MP Hollobone; all quotes from Parliament UK (2011), European Council, 8/12/2011, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmtoday/cmwhall/01.htm. Reference is also made to discursive frames on centuries of fighting for independence from continental domination and defending global trade of the UK.

I have recently been invited to three major events, the European Migration Network’s (EMN) annual conference on 25 October in Warsaw, the EU Council’s Strategic Committee for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) on 8 November in Brussels and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s annual conference on 21-22 November again in Warsaw. In addition, I also addressed a seminar by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) and others on 24 October in Madrid. All four events concentrated on the phenomenon of irregular migration, though from rather different perspectives; these highlight a rift running through the EU, not surprising though, as well as the future challenges. These shall be briefly highlighted.

The EMN is the network of the EU member states’ own research institutes which mainly serve the needs of governments and parliaments. This year’s conference was held in Warsaw, attended by around 200 people (EMN 2011) and devoted to ‘Combating Illegal Migration’. The SCIFA meeting, amongst others, addressed the issue of ‘illegal migration – current trends and priorities for further action’. It was attended by maybe 150 participants, all representatives from the member states, mainly from Ministries of Interior and or migration departments. The meeting was addressed by IOM, Frontex and myself.[i] The MICINN (2011) seminar on ‘International Migration and Security’ suggested ‘new issues, new approaches’. Finally, the FRA conference on the 'Dignity and Rights of Irregular Immigrants' was attended by 300 participants from governments, NGOs and some academics. Already the titles illustrate that these events had rather contrasting aims.

These conferences were held against the background of a decreasing irregular immigrant population and irregular border crossings in the EU. The research I presented at these meetings which is also acknowledged by various EU documents suggests that clandestine entry to the EU is down to 100,000 to 150,000 apprehensions which is only 0,021 percent of all arrivals from outside the EU. Also the irregular immigrant population in the EU has decreased from an estimated 3.1-5.3 million in 2002 to 1.9-3.8 million in the EU-27 in 2008, 0.39-0.77 percent of the total EU population, 499 million in 2008. This decline can be explained by the combined effect of (1) EU expansion, various previous sending countries of IM, including Poland, have become member states; (2) legal migration channels and improved access to visa; (3) the regularisation of over 3.5 million irregular migrants since 1996; (4) enhanced border and internal immigration controls and law enforcement, return now stand at around 250,000 annually; and (5) the consequences of the economic crisis which distracts further immigration (Düvell and Vollmer 2011). Finally, EU levels of irregular immigration are much lower than in the EU, implying that the EU is faring much better than the US (Düvell 2011).

At the November 2011 FRA conference Frontex director Laitinen acknowledged that ‘border controls are not the solution’ to the migration challenge, ‘it is an illusion’ he argued. Frontex deputy director Arias, at the October 2011 MICINN seminar, agreed that ‘entry controls do not prevent people to come’ and implied that the focus on border security is not particular effective. Instead, he suggested that exit controls are probably more useful, ‘that’s why member states are so keen to have bilateral agreements’ with the neighbourhood countries. By and large, Arias acknowledged that often Frontex’ ‘activities are politically driven’ and not by intelligence as they ‘like to believe’. And whilst migration and security are often discursively linked he rejected this perception, there is ‘no link between migration and security’. In contrast, at the November 2011 SCIFA meeting the Commission representative reiterated the perception that ‘the pressure on our borders …with stay with us’. Meanwhile, the German representative insisted that despite decreasing numbers, illegal migration ‘remains a big problem’, that ‘regional concentration [leads to] high political [meaning media] attention’ and thus irregular migration continues to be of ‘high political significance’. Finally, the Polish chair insisted that ‘we have to continue until all our borders are safe’. Thus, certain actors either do not believe or acknowledge that the situation has relaxed and instead insist to continue or even intensify ‘combating illegal migration’ (EMN 2011). This suggests that policy responses are mainly (a) driven by media discourses and public perception and (b) by political principles.

In contrast, at the 2011 FRA conference speakers insisted that the EU has to 'protect fundamental rights of all present on our territory' including irregular immigrants (Malmström, EU Commissioner), that ‘we have to protect fundamental rights’ (Brande, Commission of the Regions), that ‘everybody should enjoy their fundamental rights 'regardless of their legal status' (Kang, UNHC for Human Rights) and that 'you don't need a visa or residence permit to be entitled to human rights' (Kjaerum, director, FRA) (also see FRA 2011). Also at the EMN 2011 conference, key note speakers called for a more ‘balanced approach’ to irregular migration, implying greater attention to human rights issues. The Portuguese secretary of State Duarte, at the 2011 FRA conference insisted ‘that we must find the solution elsewhere, namely in establishing a number of core rights that must be granted to undocumented migrants’. At the 2011 MICINN seminar, the Spanish Secretary of State Terron went a step further and suggested that ‘first, migrant security, …avoiding vulnerability [and] giving individual security’ should be considered. Finally, Polish undersecretary Szpunar in his concluding remarks at the FRA conference promoted ‘openness’ and suggested that ‘regularization’, a hotly contested policy in the EU, ‘is a good example …to addressing the problem of irregular migration’ (all FRA conference quotes see FRA 2011b). Through these events, important cornerstones are set for the future direction of EU policies in the field. Notably the FRA conference illustrates that after a decade or so of campaigning and lobbying the international and some European and international institutions, as well as some departments in some member states have now accepted that irregular immigrants have rights and thus challenge the conventional enforcement agenda often demanded by the media, promoted by conservative parties and insisted by ministries for the interior. This new acknowledgement of fundamental right of irregular immigrants, however, remains to be implemented at national and local level; so for the years to come the advocates of human rights will have to maintain pressure but rather target the national and local authorities responsible for implementing these rights.

These policy agendas on the one hand demonstrate some complementarity of EU politics - law enforcement and protecting fundamental rights - whilst on the other hand also point to some significant tension between the various actors, i.e. EU Commission, FRA, Committee of the Regions, UN and some members states, notably the national ministries of interior but also amongst and within member states. Whilst FRA promotes a rights-based approach and not even Frontex seems to believe that border controls are suitable to address the challenges of migration it is the member states, or at least some, and notably ministries of interior (spurred by media and political parties) that nevertheless insist in a normative approach and in tough law-enforcement based policies. But there is also some compromise in the air: whilst the advocates of human rights accept the states’ claim to right to protect their borders and accordingly enforce the law, even if they may not always agree with this, advocates of law enforcement may be accepting that immigration law enforcement must comply with fundamental rights even if this limits law enforcement.

References

Düvell, Franck, Vollmer, Bastian (2011), European Security Challenges. EU-US Immigration Systems, Florence: European University Institute/Robert-Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16212/EU-US%20Immigration%20Systems2011_01.pdf?sequence=1.

Düvell, Franck (2011), Irregular migration in Europe revisited, paper presented to EMN (online soon).

EMN (2011), Combating irregular migration: practical responses, annual conference, (http://emn.gov.pl/portal/ese/751/8888/EMN_Conference_2011.html)

FRA (2011), Fundamental Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation in the European Union, Vienna: FRA, (http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA_2011_Migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_EN.pdf).

FRA (2011), Fundamental rights conference, live video, day one and two, http://www.transmisjeonline.pl/TOClient/client.php?session=fb20ee4c0217ca1f458e7357ceb8a4ce

MICINN (2011), International Migration and Security, Madrid: MICINN, http://www.cchs.csic.es/sites/default/files/Security&Migration_Programme_0.pdf

Once again, the UK Border Agency is in the focus of the media for inefficiencies and flaws. So far, the policy aim is to clear EU nationals within 25 minutes and non-EU nationals within 45 minutes; it is suggested, however, that for non-EU nationals entry clearance could take as much as three hours (Times, 8/11/2011). Often, the arrival wonders about huge queues at passport controls only to find out that only a few passport desks are opened. Indeed, whilst the demand for control is constantly rising staffing levels are decreasing; due to significant budget cuts 5,000 staff will be cut in 2011 and another few thousand are projected to go in 2012.

The perceived scandal now is that in summer 2011, ID controls were relaxed for UK and EU citizens and their children as well as some finger printing and further questioning of non-EU nationals. This was to reduce queues at the border crossing points and speed up entry (Times, 8/11/2011). The allegation made now is that ‘up to 5 million foreign nationals entered the UK while the weaker rules were in operation’, it is even suggested that ‘terrorists, criminals or illegals’ could have entered the UK (Daily Mail 8/11/2011). Representatives from the Labour Party further fuel fears by suggesting that presumably ‘thousands’ of people had been allowed in to the UK who ‘may well have been stopped if the proper procedures’ had been stuck to (BBC, 8/11/2011).

The implicit claims made here are that (a) conventional passport checks are insufficient and that additional checks, like accessing the data saved on the passport chip, taking test fingerprints and asking additional questions on the travelers and their journeys are necessary to protect borders, (b) that terrorists, criminals or ‘illegals’ would be aware of this and thus exploit relaxation of controls and, finally (c) , that border controls would stop these types of people and thus increase security.

In fact, so far, the few terrorist acts that were committed in the UK or indeed elsewhere in Europe were carried out by regular immigrants or rather members of the indigenous ethnic minority population. Hence, in Europe, terrorism is not exactly an immigration issue. Also, irregular immigrants overwhelmingly, around 90 percent, arrive legally and subsequently overstay their visa. Thus, irregular migration is less a border control but more a territorial and labour market control issue. Indeed, the UK has the highest number of irregular immigrants in the EU (see Clandestino 2009). Finally, criminals in their majority are home-grown and there is little evidence that immigrants contribute in any disproportionate form to crime, so crime is not an immigration issue either. Thus, this focus on border security seems to be rather based on emotions than on facts.

Meanwhile, at the airports of the 25 Schengen countries, off course, there are no entry clearances and thus no 25 minutes or so queues for internal EU travelers. Still, entry clearance and thus resources are concentrated entirely on arrivals from outside the EU. In any case, there is no evidence so far that any of these 25 countries is less safe and experience higher levels of terrorist activities or crime than the UK. Instead, the size of the irregular immigrant population is even seem lower than in the UK.

For the international traveler to the UK the main nuisance remains that the UK refuses to adopt the Schengen free-travel agreement and instead insists in keeping its control on internal EU travel. As a consequence, any journey to and from the UK is more time-consuming and in effect journeys are slowed down considerably. Indeed, the nuisance of controls and slow travel is likely to increase due to heightened security concerns coinciding with decreasing staff levels. Second, putting mobile individuals, such as international travelers under general suspicion, meaning that anybody is considered a potential terrorist, criminal or illegal immigrant, as the UK does, is almost an offence. Thus, the internationally mobile individual might rather consider avoiding the UK, if possible.

References

BBC, 8/11/2011, Theresa May: I won't resign over UK Border Agency row,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15632423

The Times, 8/11/2011, Border wars: May will ‘never’ know effect on security;

The Times, 8/11/2011, Fears ‘Heathrow hassle’ will damage business.

Daily Mail, 8/11/2011, Blunder allowed ‘danger migrants’ to vanish.

Clandestino, 2009, Database on irregular migration, http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/category/clandestino-database-on-irregular-migr...

On 5 July, Denmark has effectively suspended the European Union’s open borders and free travel arrangement, the Schengen agreement, and reintroduced controls on its borders. All border guard stations on the roads and motorways with Germany and Sweden are manned again, even new facilities planned and the traffic is slowed down to 40 kilometres/25 miles and random controls are enforced. So far, notably German media is critical of this measure throughout; a federal minister even calls for a tourism boycott of Denmark[i]. Other media suggests that those who are heading for the Baltic dunes and beaches could alternatively holiday in Poland. Indeed, in 2010, 60 percent of all tourists came from Germany, another 8 percent each from neighbouring Norway and Sweden[ii] and Danish Media already reports large-scale holiday cancellations from Germans in protest of these measures[iii]. A Danish tourism expert, Claus Westh implies that Denmark’s tourism industry had by now suffered a significant loss. British people might not understand all this fuss because the various British governments refuse its people and visitors the right to unimpeded movement within the EU anyway[iv].

As early as 1951, the Treaty of Rome of the then European Economic Community introduced the right to unrestricted travel, work and residence of the citizens and residents of the member states within the community/union. In 1995, the Schengen agreement which in 1999 by the Amsterdam treaty was integrated into EU law, the acquis communitaire, the set of common laws of the EU, subsequently abandoned all border controls between the EU member states so that people and goods could circulate freely and unobstructed within the EU. Freedom of movement is considered a fundamental right of the citizens and residents of the EU member states. Four non-EU countries, Norway and Iceland in 1998 and Switzerland and Lichtenstein in 2008 joined this agreement; two EU member states, the UK and Ireland do not implement the open border policy and another three, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus have not yet qualified.

Freedom of movement is not simply a convenience for commuters, travelers and tourists, though this is the aspect that the people of the European Union probably appreciate most. Further to this, freedom of movement enables the free flow of labour and goods and thus decreases the costs of cross-border transportation (waiting time and customs); it enables people to easily shop or take jobs in another country and facilitates modern just-in-time production. For the people of Europe, it diminishes the relevance of borders so that crossing a border, shopping, visiting or working in a city in a neighbouring country is felt less of a nuisance and instead considered a comfortable option. Thus it is hoped that mental barriers diminish too. As a consequence, open borders should bind people together, facilitates practical, cultural and subsequently emotional European integration. Finally, this is aimed to enhances peoples’ support for what ultimately is a political and economic European project[v].

The Danish decision to reintroduce border controls is argued with the fight against cross-border crime, e.g. trafficking of drugs, arms, medicines and doping substances, money laundering, and secondary movements of irregular immigrants - often refugees - within the EU. But it is also part of a political gamble in which the centre-right ‘Venstre’ (‘Left’) party, a minority government, in order to win support for its pension reform needed the votes of the nationalist party -some label her ‘freakish semi-fascist’ (Westh, see above) - Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and in return agreed in their demand to reintroduce controls on the borders with its neighbours. Controlling borders and tasking customs with stopping and fighting crime might seem plausible to some though a closer look demonstrates that this is not clear as one might assume. For instance, if it is true, as reported[vi], that the officers deployed on the borders are customs and not border guard or police officers who do not check passports how can they then identify criminals or ‘illegal immigrants’? And if they only deploy 30 or so officers on the border with Germany who argue that they cannot control traffic flowing in two lanes anyway [vii] how can they possibly have any significant impact on cross-border criminal activities? And why is it that whilst most illicit cross-border activities are probably from the South, i.e. from Germany, also the borders with Sweden are controlled?

Borders as such rather demarcate the limits of the jurisdiction of a state and its welfare systems; borders are also designed to enclose populations and control migration. But borders are not per se designed to fight crime. It is certainly questionable whether random border controls as described above will have a significant impact on crime or even some fundamental social problems like drug consumption, doping or forced migration. Instead, crime fighting is usually the task of the police which is trained to gather evidence, investigate crime and on that basis act against criminals. Indeed, the customs officers deployed on the Danish border insist that they do not control passports but only goods and that they are not police officers[viii]. Finally, because some forms of crime are transnational and the various national police forces supported by Europol already act international too. Thus, whilst it is the police that is responsible for fighting crime the European police forces seem increasingly well prepared to also address cross-border crime[ix].

In this light, the Danish decision appears to be of highly symbolic nature. It signals (a) the allegation that threats are rather originating abroad and can be thus addressed through border controls, and (b) that current government is being active and tough. Furthermore, the Danish decision is an element of internal party politics and the forthcoming elections. Hence, for these internal and symbolic politics a fundamental European right has been degenerated to a toy at the hands of two nationalist, resp. centre-right parties. And for the sake of internal parliamentary power relations a European principle has been sacrificed. This is probably the most worrying aspect of this affair.

[i] Nigel Morris (2011), Keep your Arab Spring migrants, May tells France, The Independent 7/6/2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/keep-your-arab-spring-migrants-...

[ii] See Pro Asyl, Medico International etc (2011), Open escape routes, take in refugees!, 31/5/2011, http://www.fluechtlingsrat-hamburg.de/content/Aufruf_Voices%20from%20Choucha_engl.pdf [English version].

[iii] Thomas Hammarberg (2011), African migrants are drowning in the Mediterranean, 8/6/2011, http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=143.

[iv] UNHCR (2010), UNHCR says ordered to close office in Libya, News stories 8/6/2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4c0e79059.html.>

[v] Klaus Rösler, Frontex, operational director in TAZ (2011), “Das Mandat von Frontex ist begrenzt”, Interview, 8/6/2011, http://www.taz.de/1/politik/europa/artikel/1/das-mandat-von-frontex-ist-begre...

[vi] BBC (2011), Libya: Hundreds feared dead as migrant boat capsizes, 9/5/2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-europe-13332536; EveryOne (2011), African refugees. To perish at sea, abandoned by everybody, interview with survivor, http://www.everyonegroup.com/downloads/testimonianzaAbuKurkedaTripoli.MP3

[vii] Tom Kington (2011), Refugees from Libya attacked in Tunisian desert, The Guardian 25/5/2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/25/libya-refugees-gaddafi-regime-attacked; You Tube (2011), Report from the Refugee-Camp Choucha at the Tunisian-Libyan border, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8cDezvagFk&NR=1.

[viii] AFP, 22/05/2011

[ix] Valentina Pop (2011), Italian minister questions value of EU membership, EU Observer 11/4/2011, http://euobserver.com/9/32155

[x] Reinhard Wolff (2011), Koalition der Schlagbaume, TAZ 13/5/2011.

[xi] Kathimerini (2011), Police raze migrant camp in port city, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_09/06/2011_394238.

[xii] European Court of Human Rights (2011), Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=880339&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649

Last month, in April 2011, the transition period entitling EU member states to restrict labour mobility from the Eastern European accession countries Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia (A8) expired and all EU member states are now required to lift their restrictions. Therefore, from 1 May 2011, seven years after the A8 countries became members of the European Union, Germany (and Austria), grant full freedom of movement of workers and their families from these countries, meaning that these no longer require permission to work and are entitled to work on exactly the same jobs and to the same conditions as any German national. Hence, only workers from Romania and Bulgaria who only joined the EU in 2007 still fall under transition regulations and are required permission to work.

From 2004, Germany made full use of the maximum period during which migration restrictions were allowed under EU regulations and limited A8 migration for seven years. Still, several hundred thousand Polish nationals came to Germany, for working, either on a work permit, irregular or self-employed, for studies or other purposes. For instance, in 2004 and 2005, annually around 500,000 work permits were issued to A8 nationals, indeed many more than in the UK (2004: 134,000) (see Düvell 2006).

The German restrictions had mixed consequences on Germany and the other EU member states. On the one hand, many highly-skilled and well-trained workers, craftsmen and managers instead moved to the UK and Ireland where they contributed to the economic growth of these countries. On the other hand, because the labour markets of Germany and other possible destination countries remained closed, many of those who wanted to migrate could legally only go to the UK and Ireland. Thus, one million or so A8 nationals moved to the UK. In other words, Germany had kept its labour markets relatively closed on the expenses of the other EU member states, notably the UK and Ireland.

However, in the meantime, the main economic parameters have fundamentally changed. In 2004, Germany was suffering from some economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment whilst the UK was still booming, credit fuelled and based on its international service industries, which lead to high demands for workers. By 2011, Germany had become the economic power house of the EU based on its manufacturing industries with high growth rates and declining unemployment whilst in the UK, after an era of deindustrialisation and the blow to its global service industries economic growth is low, unemployment rising and the outlook rather bleak. So in economic terms it had made perfect sense for the UK to open up its labour markets for A8 workers in 2004 and for Germany to only open up its markets in 2011.

In the UK in 2004, the government significantly played down the expected numbers of A8 workers, only 5-17,000 were forecates. In contrast, the German government expects annual A8 immigration in the order of 100,000 people (Bundesregierung, 1/5/2011). Some sources imply that during the first years even more, 140,000 could come and that this could continue for 10 years, hence that one million people would be migrating to Germany (Ifo Institute, 30/4/2011). None of these claims, however, take into account temporary or return migration or economic development and continuing wage rises and thus decreasing migration incentives in Poland. For these reasons, the number of those who will settle down permanently will be significantly lower. In any case, Polish sources object these predictions and believe that fewer people will be leaving Poland, not at least because many of those who are willing to migrate have already done so (Der Spiegel 1/5/2011). Indeed, a certain proportion of the Polish workers that are expected in Germany would instead probably come from other EU countries, notably Ireland and the UK. Thus, a certain level of redistribution of A8 migrants could be expected that is driven not at least by market realities.

In Germany, various discursive threads run through the current debate on the possible impact of the full opening of its labour markets (see, for instance, Der Spiegel, 2011, various articles):

(1)    Some media, not surprisingly seem to like playing the ‘Polish floods’ card again (for examples see Der Spiegel, 26/4/2011).

(2)    Another concern is that the large influx of A8 workers could compete with the indigenous workforce and undercut wages. A possible consequence, as discussed, is to introduce a mandatory minimum wage that would equally apply to indigenous and foreign workers. So far, the conservative and liberal parties as well as business lobby groups had rejected such a policy, if it would nevertheless be introduced it would mean that migration had inspired a major progressive policy reform.

(3)    It is acknowledged that due to demographic ageing in Germany each year around 200,000 indigenous workers will reach retirement age, hence that under current conditions labour migration is indeed required and still labour immigration in the order of 100,000 or 140,000 annually will be too low to compensate for this decrease in the labour force (Bundesregierung, 1/5/2011). Hence, even more incentives for further migration from non-EU countries are considered, e.g. permitting foreign students to stay in Germany beyond their studies for employment or recruiting care workers from non-EU countries.

(4)    It is also recognised that German nationals already migrate or commute for working (and studying) to A8 and other neighbouring countries, notably Switzerland and Denmark, but also to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, that there are opportunities in these countries and thus it is suggested that there is some mutuality in the migration between Germany and the A8 countries. In total, German netmigration is already negative for the past four years.

(5)    Finally, it is suggested that large-scale emigration from Poland, notably of skilled workers could cause a ‘brain drain’ and have adverse effects on the otherwise healthy and growing Polish economy which would in turn also impact on Germany’s export industries. Indeed, there is some competition for skilled workers between Germany, Poland and Czech Republic which could generate some interesting developments, e.g. in terms of wages offered to sought-after professions.

Hence, by and large, as it seems, the anticipated large-scale labour migration from the A8 countries to Germany, if it does materialise at all, does not raise significant concerns and is probably rather perceived as a positive though challenging rather than a negative development.

Literature

Düvell, Franck 2006, Entwicklung der Migration nach der EU-Erweiterung. In Bommes, Michael; Schiffauer, Werner (eds.) Migrationsreport 2006. Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven. Frankfurt: Campus, pp. 63-112.

Düvell, Franck, Garapich, Michal 2011, Polish migration to the UK: continuities and discontinuities, COMPAS Working paper 11/84, Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Working_Papers/WP1184%20Duvell-Garapich.pdf.