On Wednesday 8 December, the British Prime minister backed by his cabinet exploited the current economic crisis of the EU to veto changes to EU treaties. Notably, he vetoed fiscal control, financial regulations and taxation of financial activities (‘Tobin tax’), which aimed at stabilising the Eurozone, thus the EU economy and subsequently the EU as such but also at addressing some of the shortcomings of the current global financial system. This followed an earlier decision not to contribute to bailing out other member states in crisis, like Greece or Portugal. The two main arguments made were that this is to protect the economic interest of the financial centre of London, ‘the city’ is it is labelled, and that it is in the national interest of the UK. In other words it is in the national interest of the UK to protect ‘the city’. Five points I would like to make here.

First, the UK, during the Thatcher, Major and Blair years pursued another policy than Germany or Italy; it went down the road of deindustrialisation and instead favoured international and domestic services and trade. As a consequence, manufacturing shrank from 22 percent of the GDP in 1990 to only 11 percent in 2009 (Germany: 25 percent, Italy: 20 percent, France: 12.3 percent) and was overtaken by the financial centre of London long ago (BIS 2010). ‘The City’ not only is ‘the largest international banking centre in the world, with banks in the UK accounting for over 20% of global cross-border banking business’ (City of London 2011a). As such it 'has become vital to the UK economy and contributes $565 billion or around 20 percent to the total UK GDP (in 2007) (City of London 2007).  The finance sector is not only central to the UK economy; the UK is also only competitive as a location under the current unregulated conditions it offers.

Second, in the present discussion in the UK, it is widely ignored that it was the politics of the British, and other governments of course, to deregulate financial services, and allow enormous borrowing, lending to private households and states and thus facilitated an economy that is based on dept. The idea was that this would function almost as a perpetuum mobile of never-ending economic growth. In effect, however, the ‘western’ lower and middle classes became entrapped in dept, the ‘southern’ lower classes are starving to their millions whilst the upper classes got ever more affluent and the gap between the haves and have-nots got ever wider. Thus, this system de facto redistributed the global wealth from the bottom to the top. Finally, however, all this collapsed. The mess we are in is thus in part the very responsibility of 'the city' that the UK - Cameron and his liberal deputy Clegg - are now so fiercely protecting. In other words, the British 'national interest' seems to be to continue for very selfish reasons with an economic model that proved disastrous and ruinous for the lives of billions of people!

Third, it has been explained by the British Prime Minister that the decision to object a joint European approach is based on the perceived national interest of the UK (Number 10 2011). This demonstrates that the UK’s politics is now inspired by protectionist and nationalist agendas. It is based on the believe that what is good for the people living on that island can only be achieved by a separate British way and even against the way of the people living in other countries. This nationalist doctrine is complemented by a surge of anti-immigration sentiments. These date back to the mid-2000s and were triggered by the arrival of Polish and other EU nationals coming to work in the UK. This first culminated in 2007, when some sections of the working class launched demonstrations against immigrant workers taking what they perceived were their jobs. The then labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007) in response suggested ‘British jobs for British workers' and thus sanctioned the rise of a hugely nationalist and anti-immigrant agenda. The current conservative government, pushed by some right-wing media attacked the labour government for letting in too many migrants and one of its main policy aims is to diminish immigration. It is thus maybe less of a surprise that only one other country rejected the EU proposal on financial stability and that is Hungary, a country with a proto-fascist government on the brink of insolvency. Already in the European parliament, the British conservative parliamentarians had left the more centre right (Christian democrat pro-Europeans) faction to join the Euro-skeptic far right. Thus the UK is now allied with the most right-wing parties and governments in the EU.

Fourth, over the years, the anti-European and anti-EU rhetoric has successively begun dominating the public policy discourse in the UK. The last years were a period of constantly dripping poison from all parties, Labour, the Conservatives and the right-wing media. In recent month, commentators were almost enjoying the trouble the Euro-zone is in and it seemed they could not wait for it to collapse. Meanwhile, the anti-European rhetoric in the UK – anger over Brussels bureaucracy, regulatory politics or even the EU’s human rights legislation - has almost reached the level of hate-speech (see appendix below). Also the way the French and German leaders are depicted almost reactivates anachronistic images of the eternal arch enemies. Some of this is simply to distract attention from the problems of the UK by focusing on the problems of other countries or even to scapegoat others for the current troubles. For instance, the UK economy is doing much worse than that of several other EU countries; also national bureaucracy is at least as bad, if not worse than what is coming from the EU. These UK responses may in part also be due to the fierce competition from other European countries over technologies, manufacturing, transportation, global services or indeed international power.

Fifth, after WW I the UK has lost its global economic leadership to the US and the dollar, after WW II it lost its colonies to the independence movements and ever since the 1970s, when it joined the then EC, it nevertheless missed its opportunity to instead become a leading player in Europe. On the one hand, the UK likes to present itself as a political, cultural and technological leader on a global scale (see Brown 2007). On the other hand, many seem to envy Germany for its technological and economic success, the French for their ‘savoir vivre’ and the Spanish for their climate whilst still assuming some cultural superiority of Englishness. In any case, the UK seems to never coming to terms with the loss of their empire whilst they also cannot accept the transformation of the Westphalian state order, the idea of sovereign and separate nation states. It may be that it is the literal insular geography of the UK and a deep conservatism rooted in rural England that facilitates such an inflexible mentality of statelessness. Or it may be that the UK perceives its combined military power (it engages in any possible conflict that emerges, e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) and economic power (through London it manages large parts of global capital flows) as strong enough to be able to sustain even a small nation state against the likes of the US, EU, Russia, China, India and other emerging powers.

To sum up, in response to the current economic and political crises the UK opted for a combination of anti-immigration, protectionist, anti-European and nationalist but also occasionally militarist and simultaneously ruthlessly selfish and callous neo-liberal agendas. The UK has alienated most other member states and is now de facto allied with the far-right, sometimes almost proto-fascist parties and governments in Europe. In the statements ensuing from the British veto it became clear, not for the first time though, that the UK is mainly interested in free trade and in the EU as a single market and not as a political project. Thus, the UK looks at Europe from a purely neo-liberal perspective. The main reason why the UK does not yet leave the EU, as many conservatives would probably hope, seems to be this economic deliberation.

References

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BILS (2010), Manufacturing in the UK, Economic paper 10b, London: BIS, www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-sectors/docs/m/10-1334-manufacturing-in-the-uk-supplementary-analysis.pdf

Brown, Gordon (2007), Labour party conference speech,

City of London (2007), A capital contribution - London’s Place in the UK Economy, 2007-08, news release, http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/media_centre/files2007/A+capital+contribution+-+Londons+Place+in+the+UK+Economy+2007-08.htm

City of London (2011a), Research and statistics, http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/LGNL_Services/Business/Business_support_and_advice/Economic_information_and_analysis/Research+and+statistics+FAQ.htm

Number 10 (2011), Eurozone: 'I will protect the national interest’ PM says, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/eurozone-i-will-protect-national-interest-says-pm/

Appendix

The following quotes only give a flavour of the current discourse on the EU and only refer to some comments made during debates in parliament.

‘The British national interest: safeguarding the single market and the financial services’, Prime Minister Cameron; (see Parliament UK 2011, House of Commons, Oral answers to questions, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa.cam201011/cmhansrd/cm111207/debtext/111207-0001.htm#11120739000033). ‘EU institutions operate against our interests’, MP Jenkin; ‘truly frightening conglomeration of power on the continent’ MP Leigh; [relocating a the currency clearing house] is ‘daylight robbery and stealing our business’, MP Leadsom; ‘the creation of a de facto country perhaps called Greater Germany’ MP Jackson; ‘people are fed up with mindless interference from the EU’, MP Baron; ‘the fantasy world ...of trying to create economic and political union’, ’other countries ...are in effect economic satellites of Germany’, MP Cash; ‘we want control over our borders back because [my constituents] are fed up with mass immigration from the European Union’, MP Hollobone; all quotes from Parliament UK (2011), European Council, 8/12/2011, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmtoday/cmwhall/01.htm. Reference is also made to discursive frames on centuries of fighting for independence from continental domination and defending global trade of the UK.

I have recently been invited to three major events, the European Migration Network’s (EMN) annual conference on 25 October in Warsaw, the EU Council’s Strategic Committee for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) on 8 November in Brussels and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s annual conference on 21-22 November again in Warsaw. In addition, I also addressed a seminar by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) and others on 24 October in Madrid. All four events concentrated on the phenomenon of irregular migration, though from rather different perspectives; these highlight a rift running through the EU, not surprising though, as well as the future challenges. These shall be briefly highlighted.

The EMN is the network of the EU member states’ own research institutes which mainly serve the needs of governments and parliaments. This year’s conference was held in Warsaw, attended by around 200 people (EMN 2011) and devoted to ‘Combating Illegal Migration’. The SCIFA meeting, amongst others, addressed the issue of ‘illegal migration – current trends and priorities for further action’. It was attended by maybe 150 participants, all representatives from the member states, mainly from Ministries of Interior and or migration departments. The meeting was addressed by IOM, Frontex and myself.[i] The MICINN (2011) seminar on ‘International Migration and Security’ suggested ‘new issues, new approaches’. Finally, the FRA conference on the 'Dignity and Rights of Irregular Immigrants' was attended by 300 participants from governments, NGOs and some academics. Already the titles illustrate that these events had rather contrasting aims.

These conferences were held against the background of a decreasing irregular immigrant population and irregular border crossings in the EU. The research I presented at these meetings which is also acknowledged by various EU documents suggests that clandestine entry to the EU is down to 100,000 to 150,000 apprehensions which is only 0,021 percent of all arrivals from outside the EU. Also the irregular immigrant population in the EU has decreased from an estimated 3.1-5.3 million in 2002 to 1.9-3.8 million in the EU-27 in 2008, 0.39-0.77 percent of the total EU population, 499 million in 2008. This decline can be explained by the combined effect of (1) EU expansion, various previous sending countries of IM, including Poland, have become member states; (2) legal migration channels and improved access to visa; (3) the regularisation of over 3.5 million irregular migrants since 1996; (4) enhanced border and internal immigration controls and law enforcement, return now stand at around 250,000 annually; and (5) the consequences of the economic crisis which distracts further immigration (Düvell and Vollmer 2011). Finally, EU levels of irregular immigration are much lower than in the EU, implying that the EU is faring much better than the US (Düvell 2011).

At the November 2011 FRA conference Frontex director Laitinen acknowledged that ‘border controls are not the solution’ to the migration challenge, ‘it is an illusion’ he argued. Frontex deputy director Arias, at the October 2011 MICINN seminar, agreed that ‘entry controls do not prevent people to come’ and implied that the focus on border security is not particular effective. Instead, he suggested that exit controls are probably more useful, ‘that’s why member states are so keen to have bilateral agreements’ with the neighbourhood countries. By and large, Arias acknowledged that often Frontex’ ‘activities are politically driven’ and not by intelligence as they ‘like to believe’. And whilst migration and security are often discursively linked he rejected this perception, there is ‘no link between migration and security’. In contrast, at the November 2011 SCIFA meeting the Commission representative reiterated the perception that ‘the pressure on our borders …with stay with us’. Meanwhile, the German representative insisted that despite decreasing numbers, illegal migration ‘remains a big problem’, that ‘regional concentration [leads to] high political [meaning media] attention’ and thus irregular migration continues to be of ‘high political significance’. Finally, the Polish chair insisted that ‘we have to continue until all our borders are safe’. Thus, certain actors either do not believe or acknowledge that the situation has relaxed and instead insist to continue or even intensify ‘combating illegal migration’ (EMN 2011). This suggests that policy responses are mainly (a) driven by media discourses and public perception and (b) by political principles.

In contrast, at the 2011 FRA conference speakers insisted that the EU has to 'protect fundamental rights of all present on our territory' including irregular immigrants (Malmström, EU Commissioner), that ‘we have to protect fundamental rights’ (Brande, Commission of the Regions), that ‘everybody should enjoy their fundamental rights 'regardless of their legal status' (Kang, UNHC for Human Rights) and that 'you don't need a visa or residence permit to be entitled to human rights' (Kjaerum, director, FRA) (also see FRA 2011). Also at the EMN 2011 conference, key note speakers called for a more ‘balanced approach’ to irregular migration, implying greater attention to human rights issues. The Portuguese secretary of State Duarte, at the 2011 FRA conference insisted ‘that we must find the solution elsewhere, namely in establishing a number of core rights that must be granted to undocumented migrants’. At the 2011 MICINN seminar, the Spanish Secretary of State Terron went a step further and suggested that ‘first, migrant security, …avoiding vulnerability [and] giving individual security’ should be considered. Finally, Polish undersecretary Szpunar in his concluding remarks at the FRA conference promoted ‘openness’ and suggested that ‘regularization’, a hotly contested policy in the EU, ‘is a good example …to addressing the problem of irregular migration’ (all FRA conference quotes see FRA 2011b). Through these events, important cornerstones are set for the future direction of EU policies in the field. Notably the FRA conference illustrates that after a decade or so of campaigning and lobbying the international and some European and international institutions, as well as some departments in some member states have now accepted that irregular immigrants have rights and thus challenge the conventional enforcement agenda often demanded by the media, promoted by conservative parties and insisted by ministries for the interior. This new acknowledgement of fundamental right of irregular immigrants, however, remains to be implemented at national and local level; so for the years to come the advocates of human rights will have to maintain pressure but rather target the national and local authorities responsible for implementing these rights.

These policy agendas on the one hand demonstrate some complementarity of EU politics - law enforcement and protecting fundamental rights - whilst on the other hand also point to some significant tension between the various actors, i.e. EU Commission, FRA, Committee of the Regions, UN and some members states, notably the national ministries of interior but also amongst and within member states. Whilst FRA promotes a rights-based approach and not even Frontex seems to believe that border controls are suitable to address the challenges of migration it is the member states, or at least some, and notably ministries of interior (spurred by media and political parties) that nevertheless insist in a normative approach and in tough law-enforcement based policies. But there is also some compromise in the air: whilst the advocates of human rights accept the states’ claim to right to protect their borders and accordingly enforce the law, even if they may not always agree with this, advocates of law enforcement may be accepting that immigration law enforcement must comply with fundamental rights even if this limits law enforcement.

References

Düvell, Franck, Vollmer, Bastian (2011), European Security Challenges. EU-US Immigration Systems, Florence: European University Institute/Robert-Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16212/EU-US%20Immigration%20Systems2011_01.pdf?sequence=1.

Düvell, Franck (2011), Irregular migration in Europe revisited, paper presented to EMN (online soon).

EMN (2011), Combating irregular migration: practical responses, annual conference, (http://emn.gov.pl/portal/ese/751/8888/EMN_Conference_2011.html)

FRA (2011), Fundamental Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation in the European Union, Vienna: FRA, (http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA_2011_Migrants_in_an_irregular_situation_EN.pdf).

FRA (2011), Fundamental rights conference, live video, day one and two, http://www.transmisjeonline.pl/TOClient/client.php?session=fb20ee4c0217ca1f458e7357ceb8a4ce

MICINN (2011), International Migration and Security, Madrid: MICINN, http://www.cchs.csic.es/sites/default/files/Security&Migration_Programme_0.pdf

Once again, the UK Border Agency is in the focus of the media for inefficiencies and flaws. So far, the policy aim is to clear EU nationals within 25 minutes and non-EU nationals within 45 minutes; it is suggested, however, that for non-EU nationals entry clearance could take as much as three hours (Times, 8/11/2011). Often, the arrival wonders about huge queues at passport controls only to find out that only a few passport desks are opened. Indeed, whilst the demand for control is constantly rising staffing levels are decreasing; due to significant budget cuts 5,000 staff will be cut in 2011 and another few thousand are projected to go in 2012.

The perceived scandal now is that in summer 2011, ID controls were relaxed for UK and EU citizens and their children as well as some finger printing and further questioning of non-EU nationals. This was to reduce queues at the border crossing points and speed up entry (Times, 8/11/2011). The allegation made now is that ‘up to 5 million foreign nationals entered the UK while the weaker rules were in operation’, it is even suggested that ‘terrorists, criminals or illegals’ could have entered the UK (Daily Mail 8/11/2011). Representatives from the Labour Party further fuel fears by suggesting that presumably ‘thousands’ of people had been allowed in to the UK who ‘may well have been stopped if the proper procedures’ had been stuck to (BBC, 8/11/2011).

The implicit claims made here are that (a) conventional passport checks are insufficient and that additional checks, like accessing the data saved on the passport chip, taking test fingerprints and asking additional questions on the travelers and their journeys are necessary to protect borders, (b) that terrorists, criminals or ‘illegals’ would be aware of this and thus exploit relaxation of controls and, finally (c) , that border controls would stop these types of people and thus increase security.

In fact, so far, the few terrorist acts that were committed in the UK or indeed elsewhere in Europe were carried out by regular immigrants or rather members of the indigenous ethnic minority population. Hence, in Europe, terrorism is not exactly an immigration issue. Also, irregular immigrants overwhelmingly, around 90 percent, arrive legally and subsequently overstay their visa. Thus, irregular migration is less a border control but more a territorial and labour market control issue. Indeed, the UK has the highest number of irregular immigrants in the EU (see Clandestino 2009). Finally, criminals in their majority are home-grown and there is little evidence that immigrants contribute in any disproportionate form to crime, so crime is not an immigration issue either. Thus, this focus on border security seems to be rather based on emotions than on facts.

Meanwhile, at the airports of the 25 Schengen countries, off course, there are no entry clearances and thus no 25 minutes or so queues for internal EU travelers. Still, entry clearance and thus resources are concentrated entirely on arrivals from outside the EU. In any case, there is no evidence so far that any of these 25 countries is less safe and experience higher levels of terrorist activities or crime than the UK. Instead, the size of the irregular immigrant population is even seem lower than in the UK.

For the international traveler to the UK the main nuisance remains that the UK refuses to adopt the Schengen free-travel agreement and instead insists in keeping its control on internal EU travel. As a consequence, any journey to and from the UK is more time-consuming and in effect journeys are slowed down considerably. Indeed, the nuisance of controls and slow travel is likely to increase due to heightened security concerns coinciding with decreasing staff levels. Second, putting mobile individuals, such as international travelers under general suspicion, meaning that anybody is considered a potential terrorist, criminal or illegal immigrant, as the UK does, is almost an offence. Thus, the internationally mobile individual might rather consider avoiding the UK, if possible.

References

BBC, 8/11/2011, Theresa May: I won't resign over UK Border Agency row,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15632423

The Times, 8/11/2011, Border wars: May will ‘never’ know effect on security;

The Times, 8/11/2011, Fears ‘Heathrow hassle’ will damage business.

Daily Mail, 8/11/2011, Blunder allowed ‘danger migrants’ to vanish.

Clandestino, 2009, Database on irregular migration, http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/category/clandestino-database-on-irregular-migr...

On 5 July, Denmark has effectively suspended the European Union’s open borders and free travel arrangement, the Schengen agreement, and reintroduced controls on its borders. All border guard stations on the roads and motorways with Germany and Sweden are manned again, even new facilities planned and the traffic is slowed down to 40 kilometres/25 miles and random controls are enforced. So far, notably German media is critical of this measure throughout; a federal minister even calls for a tourism boycott of Denmark[i]. Other media suggests that those who are heading for the Baltic dunes and beaches could alternatively holiday in Poland. Indeed, in 2010, 60 percent of all tourists came from Germany, another 8 percent each from neighbouring Norway and Sweden[ii] and Danish Media already reports large-scale holiday cancellations from Germans in protest of these measures[iii]. A Danish tourism expert, Claus Westh implies that Denmark’s tourism industry had by now suffered a significant loss. British people might not understand all this fuss because the various British governments refuse its people and visitors the right to unimpeded movement within the EU anyway[iv].

As early as 1951, the Treaty of Rome of the then European Economic Community introduced the right to unrestricted travel, work and residence of the citizens and residents of the member states within the community/union. In 1995, the Schengen agreement which in 1999 by the Amsterdam treaty was integrated into EU law, the acquis communitaire, the set of common laws of the EU, subsequently abandoned all border controls between the EU member states so that people and goods could circulate freely and unobstructed within the EU. Freedom of movement is considered a fundamental right of the citizens and residents of the EU member states. Four non-EU countries, Norway and Iceland in 1998 and Switzerland and Lichtenstein in 2008 joined this agreement; two EU member states, the UK and Ireland do not implement the open border policy and another three, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus have not yet qualified.

Freedom of movement is not simply a convenience for commuters, travelers and tourists, though this is the aspect that the people of the European Union probably appreciate most. Further to this, freedom of movement enables the free flow of labour and goods and thus decreases the costs of cross-border transportation (waiting time and customs); it enables people to easily shop or take jobs in another country and facilitates modern just-in-time production. For the people of Europe, it diminishes the relevance of borders so that crossing a border, shopping, visiting or working in a city in a neighbouring country is felt less of a nuisance and instead considered a comfortable option. Thus it is hoped that mental barriers diminish too. As a consequence, open borders should bind people together, facilitates practical, cultural and subsequently emotional European integration. Finally, this is aimed to enhances peoples’ support for what ultimately is a political and economic European project[v].

The Danish decision to reintroduce border controls is argued with the fight against cross-border crime, e.g. trafficking of drugs, arms, medicines and doping substances, money laundering, and secondary movements of irregular immigrants - often refugees - within the EU. But it is also part of a political gamble in which the centre-right ‘Venstre’ (‘Left’) party, a minority government, in order to win support for its pension reform needed the votes of the nationalist party -some label her ‘freakish semi-fascist’ (Westh, see above) - Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and in return agreed in their demand to reintroduce controls on the borders with its neighbours. Controlling borders and tasking customs with stopping and fighting crime might seem plausible to some though a closer look demonstrates that this is not clear as one might assume. For instance, if it is true, as reported[vi], that the officers deployed on the borders are customs and not border guard or police officers who do not check passports how can they then identify criminals or ‘illegal immigrants’? And if they only deploy 30 or so officers on the border with Germany who argue that they cannot control traffic flowing in two lanes anyway [vii] how can they possibly have any significant impact on cross-border criminal activities? And why is it that whilst most illicit cross-border activities are probably from the South, i.e. from Germany, also the borders with Sweden are controlled?

Borders as such rather demarcate the limits of the jurisdiction of a state and its welfare systems; borders are also designed to enclose populations and control migration. But borders are not per se designed to fight crime. It is certainly questionable whether random border controls as described above will have a significant impact on crime or even some fundamental social problems like drug consumption, doping or forced migration. Instead, crime fighting is usually the task of the police which is trained to gather evidence, investigate crime and on that basis act against criminals. Indeed, the customs officers deployed on the Danish border insist that they do not control passports but only goods and that they are not police officers[viii]. Finally, because some forms of crime are transnational and the various national police forces supported by Europol already act international too. Thus, whilst it is the police that is responsible for fighting crime the European police forces seem increasingly well prepared to also address cross-border crime[ix].

In this light, the Danish decision appears to be of highly symbolic nature. It signals (a) the allegation that threats are rather originating abroad and can be thus addressed through border controls, and (b) that current government is being active and tough. Furthermore, the Danish decision is an element of internal party politics and the forthcoming elections. Hence, for these internal and symbolic politics a fundamental European right has been degenerated to a toy at the hands of two nationalist, resp. centre-right parties. And for the sake of internal parliamentary power relations a European principle has been sacrificed. This is probably the most worrying aspect of this affair.

[i] Nigel Morris (2011), Keep your Arab Spring migrants, May tells France, The Independent 7/6/2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/keep-your-arab-spring-migrants-...

[ii] See Pro Asyl, Medico International etc (2011), Open escape routes, take in refugees!, 31/5/2011, http://www.fluechtlingsrat-hamburg.de/content/Aufruf_Voices%20from%20Choucha_engl.pdf [English version].

[iii] Thomas Hammarberg (2011), African migrants are drowning in the Mediterranean, 8/6/2011, http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=143.

[iv] UNHCR (2010), UNHCR says ordered to close office in Libya, News stories 8/6/2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4c0e79059.html.>

[v] Klaus Rösler, Frontex, operational director in TAZ (2011), “Das Mandat von Frontex ist begrenzt”, Interview, 8/6/2011, http://www.taz.de/1/politik/europa/artikel/1/das-mandat-von-frontex-ist-begre...

[vi] BBC (2011), Libya: Hundreds feared dead as migrant boat capsizes, 9/5/2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-europe-13332536; EveryOne (2011), African refugees. To perish at sea, abandoned by everybody, interview with survivor, http://www.everyonegroup.com/downloads/testimonianzaAbuKurkedaTripoli.MP3

[vii] Tom Kington (2011), Refugees from Libya attacked in Tunisian desert, The Guardian 25/5/2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/25/libya-refugees-gaddafi-regime-attacked; You Tube (2011), Report from the Refugee-Camp Choucha at the Tunisian-Libyan border, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G8cDezvagFk&NR=1.

[viii] AFP, 22/05/2011

[ix] Valentina Pop (2011), Italian minister questions value of EU membership, EU Observer 11/4/2011, http://euobserver.com/9/32155

[x] Reinhard Wolff (2011), Koalition der Schlagbaume, TAZ 13/5/2011.

[xi] Kathimerini (2011), Police raze migrant camp in port city, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_09/06/2011_394238.

[xii] European Court of Human Rights (2011), Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=880339&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649

Last month, in April 2011, the transition period entitling EU member states to restrict labour mobility from the Eastern European accession countries Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia (A8) expired and all EU member states are now required to lift their restrictions. Therefore, from 1 May 2011, seven years after the A8 countries became members of the European Union, Germany (and Austria), grant full freedom of movement of workers and their families from these countries, meaning that these no longer require permission to work and are entitled to work on exactly the same jobs and to the same conditions as any German national. Hence, only workers from Romania and Bulgaria who only joined the EU in 2007 still fall under transition regulations and are required permission to work.

From 2004, Germany made full use of the maximum period during which migration restrictions were allowed under EU regulations and limited A8 migration for seven years. Still, several hundred thousand Polish nationals came to Germany, for working, either on a work permit, irregular or self-employed, for studies or other purposes. For instance, in 2004 and 2005, annually around 500,000 work permits were issued to A8 nationals, indeed many more than in the UK (2004: 134,000) (see Düvell 2006).

The German restrictions had mixed consequences on Germany and the other EU member states. On the one hand, many highly-skilled and well-trained workers, craftsmen and managers instead moved to the UK and Ireland where they contributed to the economic growth of these countries. On the other hand, because the labour markets of Germany and other possible destination countries remained closed, many of those who wanted to migrate could legally only go to the UK and Ireland. Thus, one million or so A8 nationals moved to the UK. In other words, Germany had kept its labour markets relatively closed on the expenses of the other EU member states, notably the UK and Ireland.

However, in the meantime, the main economic parameters have fundamentally changed. In 2004, Germany was suffering from some economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment whilst the UK was still booming, credit fuelled and based on its international service industries, which lead to high demands for workers. By 2011, Germany had become the economic power house of the EU based on its manufacturing industries with high growth rates and declining unemployment whilst in the UK, after an era of deindustrialisation and the blow to its global service industries economic growth is low, unemployment rising and the outlook rather bleak. So in economic terms it had made perfect sense for the UK to open up its labour markets for A8 workers in 2004 and for Germany to only open up its markets in 2011.

In the UK in 2004, the government significantly played down the expected numbers of A8 workers, only 5-17,000 were forecates. In contrast, the German government expects annual A8 immigration in the order of 100,000 people (Bundesregierung, 1/5/2011). Some sources imply that during the first years even more, 140,000 could come and that this could continue for 10 years, hence that one million people would be migrating to Germany (Ifo Institute, 30/4/2011). None of these claims, however, take into account temporary or return migration or economic development and continuing wage rises and thus decreasing migration incentives in Poland. For these reasons, the number of those who will settle down permanently will be significantly lower. In any case, Polish sources object these predictions and believe that fewer people will be leaving Poland, not at least because many of those who are willing to migrate have already done so (Der Spiegel 1/5/2011). Indeed, a certain proportion of the Polish workers that are expected in Germany would instead probably come from other EU countries, notably Ireland and the UK. Thus, a certain level of redistribution of A8 migrants could be expected that is driven not at least by market realities.

In Germany, various discursive threads run through the current debate on the possible impact of the full opening of its labour markets (see, for instance, Der Spiegel, 2011, various articles):

(1)    Some media, not surprisingly seem to like playing the ‘Polish floods’ card again (for examples see Der Spiegel, 26/4/2011).

(2)    Another concern is that the large influx of A8 workers could compete with the indigenous workforce and undercut wages. A possible consequence, as discussed, is to introduce a mandatory minimum wage that would equally apply to indigenous and foreign workers. So far, the conservative and liberal parties as well as business lobby groups had rejected such a policy, if it would nevertheless be introduced it would mean that migration had inspired a major progressive policy reform.

(3)    It is acknowledged that due to demographic ageing in Germany each year around 200,000 indigenous workers will reach retirement age, hence that under current conditions labour migration is indeed required and still labour immigration in the order of 100,000 or 140,000 annually will be too low to compensate for this decrease in the labour force (Bundesregierung, 1/5/2011). Hence, even more incentives for further migration from non-EU countries are considered, e.g. permitting foreign students to stay in Germany beyond their studies for employment or recruiting care workers from non-EU countries.

(4)    It is also recognised that German nationals already migrate or commute for working (and studying) to A8 and other neighbouring countries, notably Switzerland and Denmark, but also to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, that there are opportunities in these countries and thus it is suggested that there is some mutuality in the migration between Germany and the A8 countries. In total, German netmigration is already negative for the past four years.

(5)    Finally, it is suggested that large-scale emigration from Poland, notably of skilled workers could cause a ‘brain drain’ and have adverse effects on the otherwise healthy and growing Polish economy which would in turn also impact on Germany’s export industries. Indeed, there is some competition for skilled workers between Germany, Poland and Czech Republic which could generate some interesting developments, e.g. in terms of wages offered to sought-after professions.

Hence, by and large, as it seems, the anticipated large-scale labour migration from the A8 countries to Germany, if it does materialise at all, does not raise significant concerns and is probably rather perceived as a positive though challenging rather than a negative development.

Literature

Düvell, Franck 2006, Entwicklung der Migration nach der EU-Erweiterung. In Bommes, Michael; Schiffauer, Werner (eds.) Migrationsreport 2006. Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven. Frankfurt: Campus, pp. 63-112.

Düvell, Franck, Garapich, Michal 2011, Polish migration to the UK: continuities and discontinuities, COMPAS Working paper 11/84, Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Working_Papers/WP1184%20Duvell-Garapich.pdf.

It is probably three issues that stand out from the Libyan crisis; first and foremost, the conflict between the dictator and his forces and the opposition; second, the bombing campaign of the states supporting the UN resolution 1971; and last but not least, the large-scale displacement of migrant workers and refugees from Libya. This essay is about the consequences for the millions of migrant workers and their families who are directly or indirectly affected by the turmoil.

Reports on the Libyan crisis raised awareness for the size and diversity of migrant workers in Libya. Amongst a population of 6.5 million (UN Population Division 2010) there are an estimated 1.6 to 1.8 million migrants (CARIM 2010, no accurate figures are available because only the minority, 600,000, have a regular status). That is about 25-28 percent of the total population. They are from Egypt, Tunisia, China, Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Niger, Ghana, Gambia, Philippines, Vietnam, Sudan, Eritrea, Ukraine and many other countries. Often, as it seems they are migrant workers who were leaving their families behind in their countries of origin; at least almost all reports and pictures refer to men only. Hence, of the estimated 106 million migrant workers world-wide (ILO 2011), half of all global migrants, 1.4-2.4 percent have been working in Libya.

Due to the crisis in Libya, at least 407,000 migrants have already left Libya (IOM 2011a) and many have been repatriated to their country of origin (84,000 by IOM, 2011b). Many residents of Libya have been displaced within the country (e.g. UNHCR 2011) and amongst these there will also be migrants. At the moment, Libya no longer is a country where people in search for work can go and earn an income. This is the more serious for two reasons. First, after the economic crisis of 2008-2010 opportunities for migrant workers have decreased in many countries and the oil producing countries, such as Libya, with some exceptions, were amongst the remaining destinations for migrant workers. Second, the two main sending countries of migrant workers to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, after uprisings and regime change, undergo a transformation and as a consequence its economies, notably tourism is shrinking. Therefore, citizens of these countries are even less likely to find work and even more depend on opportunities for working abroad.

Not only that these migrant workers have effectively been displaced, even more so it can be assumed that most if not all have suddenly lost their jobs and thus their income. Whilst fleeing from the turmoil, they often had to leave behind the goods they had acquired and probably also some of their savings, some never received their last wages and others got their money and other valuables confiscated or rather stolen by Libyan forces (UN 22/3/2011). In 2009, migrant workers in Libya sent home $1 billion in officially recorded remittances (World Bank 2010; the money sent or taken home unrecorded is thought to be a lot more). This represented 1.7 percent of all remittances of $58.7 billion sent to developing countries in 2009. It can be assumed that these remittances have now dried out.

As a consequence of the Libyan crisis, the families of 1.6-1.8 million migrant workers in more than a dozen countries suddenly suffer from a significant loss of income; sometimes, this is maybe even the main of only source of income. Thus, millions of migrant workers and their families, altogether maybe 1.6 plus 4.8 to 1.8 plus 18 million people[i], hence 6.4-19.8 million people will immediately feel the impact of the Libyan crisis and may well drop into poverty. It is feared that this has an adverse impact on the economy of entire countries, such as Bangladesh (Financial Express 2011).

Many migrant workers who have left Libya will ask themselves, ‘what next’? Wait until things settle down in Libya and return, try to go to another country, try chances in the country of origin and/or probably keep up with poverty. But: It could take a long time until peace and prosperity returns to Libya, jobs in alternative destination countries are probably already occupied and poverty is no option anybody would chose voluntarily. So for the migrants and their families this could turn into long-term misery; globally this means that the Libyan crisis is likely to increase poverty on a global scale, at least in the short term.

Last update 5/4/2011

One month after the victory of the freedom movement in Tunisia and the fall of the authoritarian Ben Ali regime on 14 January 2011 migrants and refugees began to leave the country in smaller groups to move north to the European Union. On 10 February, 852 people arrived on the Italian island and outpost Lampedusa, just 130 miles of the coast of Tunisia (La Reppublica Palermo, 11/2/2011). Within two days, 3,000 people had arrived in around 30 boats (Tagesschau, 12/2/2011). However, in the meantime, arrivals have dropped again, mostly due to stormy weather as it seems, and on 21 and 22/2/2011 only around 240 people arrived from Tunisia (Corriere della Sera). From Egypt, where the Mubarak regime fell two weeks later so far only one boat with migrants and refugees landed in Sicily and another two on Lampedusa (NovItaly 20/2/2011). In total, around 5,330 people have arrived in Italy plus some deserting Libyan aircrews who arrived on Malta (date 24/2/2011); this has now increased to around 7,000. In the meantime, many more people from Libya,  by 3/3 200,000, fled the violence in Libya and arrived in Egypt and Tunisia (United Nations, 4/3/2011). These are mostly migrant workers, most from neighbouring but also from more distant countries, but also Libyans. By 15/3, over 300,000 people had fled Libya, plus several thousand Libyans.  

The revolutions, as it seems, had two major aims, (a) overthrowing the old regimes and establish new political orders and (b) improve the economic opportunities for all. Notably in Tunisia and Egypt, one category of people can be assumed to rather stay and enjoy the new freedom, build new lives and new societies. Another category of people may be unable or may not want to wait (any longer) until changes take effect and rather migrate. A third category of people may also stay for the time being, observe developments and await the outcome before finally making their choice. Hence, in case hopes are frustrated more people might consider migration an option. A forth category of people in these countries who are migrants or refugees in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya might either return to their country of origin or move on to other destinations including Europe. So far, this is the largest group, as yet very few have tried to get to Europe.